This paper uses a three-stage model of non-cooperative and cooperative bargaining in a free agent market to analyze the effect of revenue sharing on the decision of teams to sign a free agent. We argue that in all subgame perfect Nash equilibria, the team with the highest reservation price will get the player. We argue that revenue sharing will not alter the outcome of the game unless the proportion taken from high revenue teams is sufficiently high. We also argue that a revenue sharing system that rewards quality low-revenue teams can alter the outcome of the game while requiring a lower proportion to be taken from high revenue teams. We also argue that the revenue sharing systems can improve competitive balance by redistributing pivotal marginal players among teams. JEL Classification Codes: C7, J3, J4, L83
Introduction
Free agency has been cheered by players and agents but has been scorned by team owners. Player salaries under free agency have expanded to an extent that many fans believe small market teams now have difficulty in competing for playing talent and on the playing field, worsening the competitive balance between teams.
Under free agency, individual players own the rights to their talent while under a reserve clause, teams own the right to a player's talent. Consequently, replacing a reserve clause with free agency effectively reassigns property rights to talent from teams to players. In his seminal article on the baseball players' labor market, Rottenberg (1956) argued that the distribution of playing talent among teams would not be affected by such a reassignment. Under free agency, the team that acquires a player must compensate him in order to gain his services. Under the reserve clause, interested teams can acquire a player via a cash sale or a trade, but the trading team, instead of the player, obtains the compensation. In either case a given player would still play for the team that valued him the most, leaving competitive balance unchanged. The redistribution of property rights to playing talent from teams to players merely shifts compensation from trading teams to players. El-Hodiri and Quirk (1971) argued that if teams in a sports league are profitmaximizers, all teams must have similar revenue functions 1 if it were to trend toward perfect competitive balance 2 . This implies that equalizing revenue functions could improve competitive balance.
If teams maximize profits and fans only care about the relative quality of the team, then revenue sharing in which revenue is shifted from high revenue teams to low revenue teams will not improve competitive balance (for example, see Rottenberg (1956) , El-Hodiri and Quirk (1971) , Rascher (1997) , and Fort and Quirk (1995) ). If teams maximize profits but fans care about the relative and absolute quality of a given team, then revenue sharing can improve competitive balance (Marburger, 1997) . Furthermore, if teams maximize utility (for example, a team owner receives consumption value through the quality of the team), then revenue sharing can improve competitive balance (Rascher (1997) and Késenne (2000) ). Consequently, the impact of revenue sharing on competitive balance depends on the objectives of teams and the factors that matter to fans.
This paper explores the workings of a revenue sharing system in a free agent market in a professional sports league. We develop a bargaining game that blends noncooperative bargaining and cooperative bargaining to describe the market for free agents in a professional sports league with no revenue sharing. The results suggest that a given free agent will sign with the team that has the highest reservation price for him. Thus, in the spirit of El-Hodiri and Quirk (1971) , a revenue-sharing system that can alter reservation prices sufficiently can alter competitive balance.
We then modify the free agent model to explore how revenue sharing affects the decision to sign a free agent. In Major League Baseball and the National Football League, every team pays the same proportion of its locally-generated revenues into a central pool. This is the type of revenue-sharing system examined in papers by El-Hodiri and Quirk (1971) , Rascher (1997) , Fort and Quirk (1995) , (Marburger, 1997) , and Késenne (2000) . Fort (2003) argues that if each team shares the same proportion of its revenues, the distribution of talent and the degree of competitive balance will remain unchanged. In the context of the game developed in the present paper, such a revenue sharing system will decrease the reservation prices of all teams, both high revenue teams and low revenue teams.
In contrast, similar to a progressive income tax, we allow for a higher proportion of revenue to be taken from "high revenue" teams than from "low revenue" teams. In general, this type of revenue sharing forces the reservation price of high revenue teams down farther than it will decrease the reservation prices of low revenue teams. If the proportion of revenue taken from high revenue teams is high enough, a free agent who would have signed with a high revenue team will sign with the low revenue team instead.
Another issue that has received some attention is the incentives for revenuereceiving teams to spend some of the shared revenue on player acquisition or development. The 2003 The -2006 Major League Baseball Collective Bargaining Agreement (MLB-CBA) includes wording specifically stating that shared revenue should be used to improve the quality of revenue-receiving teams. If shared revenue is not used for these purposes, the offending club must answer to the commissioner (page 106). Whether this threat is sufficiently credible to lead revenue-receiving clubs to spend these funds on their teams is debatable. We argue that a revenue-sharing system can be arranged to give revenue receiving teams an incentive to spend shared revenues on their clubs without the sort of threat stated in the MLB-CBA. To this end, we modify the revenue-sharing system to tie the amount of revenue received to the quality of the team. This modification increases the reservation price of the low revenue team and would thus cause that team's reservation price to be increasing in the proportion of revenue shared by the high-revenue team. Moreover, we argue that the proportion of revenue required to be taken from high revenue teams will be smaller if the proportion of revenue received by quality low revenue teams increases. Consequently, this type of revenue sharing system is more palatable to high-revenue teams.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the free agent theory and summarizes its key results; section 3 presents a discussion of how revenue sharing between high and low revenue teams affects the decision to sign a free agent; section 4 discusses and concludes. We now move to a formal description of the free agent bargaining model.
The Free Agent Theory
The following hypothetical example approximates the bargaining that occurs in a free agent market and sets the stage for the theory developed below. Consider a process in which teams make initial offers to a free agent. The free agent would prefer to sign with the team gave him the highest offer but he may not take it outright. Suppose that the free agent will generate total benefits of $5,000,000 to the team that gave him the highest offer and suppose the team offers him $3,000,000 in salary. This leaves a surplus of $2,000,000 if the player signs. Suppose that the team's next-best alternative is some player who will provide it with a surplus of $500,000. The substitute player may be another free agent, a player in the team's minor league system, or a player available from another team. In any case, by signing the free agent, the team will receive a net surplus of $1,500,000. If the free agent does not sign with the team for its initial offer, it will not attain this net surplus. Since the team is better off with the free agent, he has some holdup power over the team and, consequently, has some bargaining power with which to acquire some of the net surplus.
The example involves a multi-stage game in which teams make non-cooperative bids to the free agent. He subsequently chooses to either sign for one of the initial bids or bargain with a particular team over a net surplus. We attempt to capture the spirit of this bargaining session in the formal model developed below.
The Model
Consider a two-team league with teams 1 and 2. him. The Indians thought that Urbina was not in physical shape to play, and they felt it would take several additional weeks for him to get into playing shape. Without any financial concession by Urbina, the Indians would not accept a deal (Hill, 2004) .
Negotiations broke down and Urbina eventually signed with the Detroit Tigers.
We now present a formal description of the game's stages and we summarize the analytical results. Since we use backwards induction to solve the model, we present the formal description in reverse.
Stage Three
Suppose that in stage two, the free agent has initially chosen to bargain with team j≠i but could not arrive at an agreement with it. In this stage, the free agent chooses to either bargain with team i or to sign outright for its initial offer. Regardless of what he chooses, team j will receive j s . Let i w denote the salary that the free agent receives in the second stage from cooperatively bargaining with team i. Following Nash, we assume that the player and the team will want to end up on the Pareto frontier bounded by their respective reservation prices. A reasonable bargain on that frontier is a point at which the relative loss suffered by one negotiator as a result of a move from that point exceeds the relative gain enjoyed by the other from such a move. This implies the optimal point to be that at which the product of the negotiators' utility functions is maximized. More generally, the utilities may be net of the utilities evaluated at the disagreement outcomes.
Hence the free agent and the team will choose that wage that maximizes the product of the differences in the utilities:
Differentiating (1) with respect to i w yields the first-order condition
Where * i w is referred to as the Nash Solution. Note that in every non-disagreement
For convenience we will assume that if one of the equalities holds (they cannot both hold since r w < i w ), the Nash solution will be the outcome of the negotiations. Note that the second-order condition for a maximum is satisfied with the given assumptions. Therefore, (2) implicitly defines the function 
Maximizing over w j yields the first-order condition
Note that in every non-disagreement solution max i w r w , i s
and the second-order condition for a maximum is satisfied with the given assumptions.
Therefore, (4) implicitly defines the function j 
Stage One and the Summary of the Outcome
In the first stage, the teams make closed bids which they give to the free agent in The details of the equilibrium analysis are given in Appendix 1. Summarizing, there are four subgame perfect Nash equilibrium solutions to the free agent game. In each equilibrium, the team with the highest reservation price, team 1, gets the free agent.
Depending on the levels of the initial offers, the free agent will either sign for team 1's initial offer or he will choose to bargain cooperatively with team 1. The non-uniqueness of a solution results from the structure of the game -interested teams make initial bids to the free agent who then decides to either take that offer or bargain with the highestbidding team.
Team 1 always gets the free agent because it can always outbid team 2 for his services. Team 1 can set its initial offer anywhere around the reservation price of team 2.
If team 1's offer is above team 2's reservation price, it ensures itself that the free agent will not sign with team 2. If team 1 sets its initial bid below the reservation price of team 2 but sets it high enough so that the wage the free agent can get by cooperatively bargaining with it is no lower than any possible initial bid or any cooperative outcome with team 2, then team 1 will get the free agent. Consequently, team 1 can always outbid team 2 in the sense that the free agent can do no better than signing with team 1.
This result is essentially the same as that described by Rottenberg (1956) . It is also essentially the same as that described by Quirk and Fort (1999) Table 2 provides information on relief pitchers, and Table 3 provides information on starting pitchers.
[ Tables 1, 2, After the season, Garciaparra, a shortstop, was on the market along with shortstops Edgar Renteria and Orlando Cabrera. Garciaparra signed a 1-year, $8 million contract with the Cubs. Renteria signed a 4-year $40 million contract with the Boston Red Sox, paying him, on average, $2,000,000 more than Garciaparra will earn with the Cubs. Even though Garciaparra was injured for a good portion of the 2004 season, he had a higher OPS (on-base plus slugging percentage, a commonly-used measure of offensive prowess) than either Cabrera or Renteria. This was somewhat offset by Garciaparra's lower range factor and zone ratio, measures of defensive productivity. The Cubs likely believe that the surplus that Garciaparra will provide is larger than what either Renteria or Cabrera could provide and their decision to sign him is thus consistent with the theory. We now move to an examination of the effects of revenue sharing.
Revenue Sharing and the Distribution of Players
In this section, we examine a revenue sharing system that takes a higher proportion from high revenue teams than from low revenue teams. We remain within the confines of the free agent model described above, but with some minor modifications described below.
We continue to consider a two-team league with teams 1 and 2. For simplicity, let all benefits derived from having any player on a team be from revenue and let revenue be an explicit increasing function of player talent, measured in units of player talent "t".
The rationale for this is that the representative fan's demand for baseball is an increasing and concave function of talent acquired by the team. Hence, Note that the reservation price of team 2, 2 w , is unchanged because the shared revenue is not generated by the free agent should he play for team 2 and there is nothing tying the shared revenue to team 2's reservation price for him. Therefore, altering the proportion of revenue shared will not change team 2's reservation price for the free agent.
The introduction of revenue sharing into the model does not alter the equilibrium analysis detailed in Appendix 1. In each equilibrium described in the appendix, the general result is that the team with the highest reservation price gets the player. Each equilibrium depends on the reservation prices of the teams which in turn depend on the utility functions being strictly increasing. The introduction of revenue sharing will alter the reservation price of team 1, but does not change the general result that the team with the highest reservation price still gets the player. The introduction may change which team has the highest reservation price. 
Hence, if γ is sufficiently small, the free agent will sign with team 1.
The outcome of the game depends on the particulars of the situation: the difference between team 2's reservation price and the salary that team 1 pays its substitute player relative to the additional revenue that team 1 receives from signing the free agent instead of signing the substitute player. Therefore, the model suggests that for revenue sharing to have the intended consequence of causing a high-revenue team to not sign a free agent it otherwise would, the proportion of revenue shared must be sufficiently high. This suggests that the factors that could cause γ to be sufficiently high are a sufficiently low ws1 , a sufficiently high ( )
, or a combination of any of these three characteristics. Therefore, the better the substitute player (in terms the revenue he generates, the salary he is paid, or both), the more likely it will be that revenue sharing will have the intended consequences of redistributing talent. Moreover, the lower the revenue-generating capability of the free agent, the more likely that revenue sharing will alter with which team the free agent will sign.
Built-in Incentives for Increasing the Reservation Prices of Low Revenue Teams
Here we examine a revenue-sharing plan that effectively increases the reservation price of the next-best alternative team for the free agent. The 2003-2006 MLB-CBA specifically states that "… each Club shall use its revenue sharing receipts… in an effort to improve its performance on the field." If it appears that receiving teams are not doing this, then "…the Commissioner may impose penalties on any Club that violates this obligation" (page 106). Is this an effective way of forcing receiving teams to spend their shared revenues on players? It essentially relies on a threat of some action imposed by the commissioner, and whether that threat is credible is open to debate. However, the revenue-sharing system described above can be altered so that teams that receive revenue will make their decision whether to sign a free agent based on the amount of revenue that they will receive through sharing. They will do so without the sort of threat contained in the current MLB-CBA. Recall that a proportion of team 1's revenue, γ, is paid out in the revenue-sharing plan. Suppose that the high revenue team generates total revenue of R. Therefore, the total amount paid out by team 1 in this plan is γR. Now, suppose that a proportion of this revenue is paid out to the low revenue team while the rest is kept in some fund that does not reach the low-revenue team (e.g. a league slush fund). Suppose that this proportion is increasing in the quality of the team. Let there be two types of team 2, "good" and "bad". A "good" team is one that performs relatively well on the field. Let the proportion of total revenue received by "good" team 2 be ( ) . Hence, the higher the proportion given to "good" low-revenue teams, the higher the reservation price of team 2 will be. ' 2 w is also an increasing function of γ because this sort of revenue sharing system forces the lowrevenue team to include the benefits received from revenue sharing in the decision to sign the free agent. In short, the commissioner's office does not need to put resources into monitoring teams to ensure higher rates of compliance with the goals of the revenue sharing system. Teams monitor themselves.
The corollary is that since the proportion received by a good team 2 increases, a smaller proportion of total revenue paid out by team 1 is required to reverse the inequality between their reservation prices. This type of revenue-sharing system would be more palatable to the high revenue teams. Recall that El-Hodiri and Quirk (1971) argued that absolute competitive balance (i.e. the probability of any team winning any given game is 50%) will only occur if all teams have similar revenue functions. One way to approach this condition is to equalize reservations prices.
Lastly whether teams were subject to the sort of revenue sharing system described above, players such as Wayne Gretzky, Joe Greene, Michael Jordan, and Ernie Banks would likely still have played for the same teams. These star players had high revenuegenerating capabilities and had few good substitutes, and the theory suggests that revenue sharing would have had little impact on where these sorts of star players would have played.
Revenue sharing will have the largest impact on competitive balance through the market for "marginal players" -those players who are not stars, but who are solid and productive players. Compared to the stars, these marginal players have lower revenuegenerating capabilities and have more close substitutes available. Consequently, revenue sharing systems are more likely to redistribute these types of players between teams.
These marginal players will include pivotal players -those players who can make the difference between being in contention and not being in contention. Because the revenue-sharing systems described above would redistribute more of these pivotal players, the revenue sharing system described above can improve competitive balance.
Discussion and Conclusion
This paper examines the decision of a professional sports team to sign a free agent, giving particular attention to the operation of a revenue sharing agreement in such systems. Unlike past analyses, we examine a system in which a larger proportion of revenue is taken from high-revenue teams. A free agent will sign with that team with the highest reservation price for him, and in the absence of revenue sharing, that will be the high revenue team. If there is revenue sharing, the decision of whether to sign this free agent will not be changed unless the proportion of revenue taken from the high revenue team is sufficiently high. We also argue that in the absence of specific incentives, revenue received through revenue sharing by a low revenue team will not change its reservation price for a given player because that revenue is not generated by the its players. We also examine a system that rewards quality low-revenue teams. Such a system would force low-revenue teams to account for revenue received through sharing in the objective function regarding a free agent. Such a system would cause a redistribution of some talent while requiring a smaller proportion of revenue to be taken from high-revenue teams. Both of these systems can improve competitive balance by redistributing pivotal marginal players.
One measure that has been suggested in past labor negotiations in Major League
Baseball was a decrease in the number of years of major league service a player must have before he can become a free agent. Currently, that threshold is 6. During the 1994-1995 baseball players' strike, team owners proposed to do away with baseball's arbitration system in exchange for free agency after 4 years. Decreasing the threshold of free agency would likely bring more players into the free agent market in a given year.
The existence of better substitutes for a given free agent would lower teams' reservation price of this player and, consequently, the proportion of revenues taken from high revenue teams would not need to be as large in order to improve competitive balance.
Therefore, coupled with revenue-sharing, lowering the free agency threshold would cause some free agents to sign with low-revenue teams who otherwise would have signed with large-revenue teams. For exceptional players with few good substitutes for their services (like Alex Rodriguez), the existence of revenue sharing would likely not cause them to sign with the Montreal Expos instead of, say, the Texas Rangers.
Consequently, it is the marginal players who will be affected by this agreement. Of course, being "marginal" in this sense is endogenous to the sizes of the proportion of revenue taken from the high-revenue team. As this proportion becomes larger, we increase the number of relatively high-quality players whom we refer to as "marginal".
Lastly, note that teams may find it beneficial to find creative ways of masking revenue sources so they do not appear as being generated by baseball sources (which we refer to as "masking revenue" below). History is replete with examples of teams masking their revenues. For example, Zimbalist (1994) all parking and concession revenues generated by the Cardinals. This revenue did not appear on the Cardinals balances sheet, making them look much poorer than the actually were. If masking revenue is costly for teams, they will not do so unless the expected net return from masking is positive. Revenue sharing systems increase the benefits from masking revenues. However, a revenue sharing system that explicitly rewards quality low-revenue teams would lessen this benefit because a smaller proportion of revenue needs to be taken from high-revenue teams to achieve more competitive balance. This sort of revenue-sharing system would make masking activity less-frequent than it otherwise would be. Although this paper does not examine this phenomenon, it would be an interesting study. 
Appendix 1 Equilibrium Analysis of the Free Agent Game
There are four subgame perfect Nash equilibria to the free agent bargaining game.
Below we describe each Nash equilibrium in a proposition.
Recall that when the Nash solution is chosen, it is required for the bargaining outcome to give no less utility than the disagreement point from the point of view of either party. Hence, we can discard the disagreement outcome in the third stage from consideration. In each case, team 1 gets the player and receives B 1 minus the player's wage.
Team 2 takes its best alternative which pays it s 2 .
